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Constitutional Law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-DELAWARE RIVER
BASIN COMMISSION RESOLUTION EXEMPTING ESTABLISHED USERS
FROM WATER CHARGES FAILS TO SATISFY RATIONAL
RELATIONSHIP TEST
Delaware River Basin Commission v. Bucks County
Water & Sewer Authority (1981)
In 1961, four states I and the federal government entered into the
Delaware River Basin Compact (Compact) 2 and established the Dela-
ware River Basin Commission (Commission). The Commission was
established to ensure adequate management and conservation of the
Delaware River and its tributaries (Basin).' The Commission's powers
1. Delaware River Basin Conm'n v. Bucks County Water & Sewer Auth.,
641 F.2d 1087 (3d Cir. 1981). The states through which the Delaware River
flows or which border upon the River are New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey
and Delaware. Id. at 1089.
2. Delaware River Basin Compact of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat.
688 (1961). The Compact was a response to the realization that coherent de-
velopment of the Basin's resources was impossible when left to the uncoor-
dinated decisions of the riparian states. 641 F.2d at 1089. In fact, the need
for regional action was evidenced by legal controversies over use of Basin wa-
ters. Id. at 1089 n.2, citing New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995 (1954);
New Jersey v. New York, 253 U.S. 336 (1931).
Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania are the signatory states
to the Compact, which was ratified by Congress pursuant to Article I, § 10
of the Constitution. See 641 F.2d at 1089; U.S. CONST. ART. I § 10. The
Commission is unique among interstate agencies approved by Congress, in
that Congress, in recognition of the federal interests in proper supervision of
the river, affirmatively acted to make the United States a party to the Com-
pact, rather than merely consenting to its formation. Id., citing Delaware
River Basin Compact of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961). The
Compact has been codified by each of the signatory states. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, §§6501-6512 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§32:11D-1 to -110 (West
1963); N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW §§ 21-0701 to -0723 (McKinney 1973), and
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 815.101-.106 (Purdon 1967). The governor of each
signatory state is a member of the Commission, and a fifth member is appointed
by the President of the United States. 641 F.2d at 1089.
3. 641 F.2d at 1089. The express goals of the Compact are the "planning,
conservation, utilization, development, management and control of the water
resources" of the Basin. Id., citing Delaware River Basin Compact of 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-328, § 1.3, 75 Stat. 688 (1961). The Commission was granted
broad powers to effectuate these goals, thereby ensuring "a realistic opportunity
to effectuate a comprehensive plan that concerned itself with water quality
as well as water supply, hydroelectric power, recreational areas, wildlife con-
servation and flood protection." 641 F.2d at 1089 n.3, quoting Ackerman &
Sawyer, The Uncertain Search for Environmental Policy, 120 U. PA. L. REv.
419 (1972). For a general discussion of the Compact, see Ackerman & Sawyer,
supra; Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment in Cooperative Fed-
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include the authority to impose charges for the use of water from the
Basin.4 However, this authority was expressly limited by Congress's
addition of section 15.1(b) to the Compact prior to its enactment.5
Section 15.1(b) prohibits charges for Basin water if the withdrawal
"could lawfully have been made without charge on the effective date
of the Compact." 6
The Commission did not actually collect charges until 1974 when,
with the adoption of Resolution 74-6, 7 it implemented a system of
charges for the use of the Basin's surface waters.8 Resolution 74-6 gave
4. 641 F.2d at 1089. This power is granted to the Commission by § 3.7
of the Compact. Id. Section 3.7 provides that:
The Commission may from time to time after public notice and hear-
ing fix, alter and revise rates, rentals, charges and tolls and classifica-
tions thereof, for the use of its facilities which it may own or operate
and for products and services rendered thereby without regulation or
control by any department, office or agency of any signatory party.
Delaware River Basin Compact of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-328, § 3.7, 75 Stat.
688 (1961).
This power has been held to include the power to adopt water use charges.
Borough of Morrisville v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n, 399 F. Supp. 469
(E.D. Pa. 1975), afJ'd per curiam, 532 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1976). For a discussion
of Morrisville, see note 8 infra.
5. 641 F.2d at 1089. Congress amended the Compact to include section
15.1(b) as an absolute precondition to federal participation. Id. at 1093.
6. 1d. Section 15.1(b) of the Compact provides in pertinent part: "No pro-
vision of § 3.7 of the Compact shall be deemed to authorize the Com-
mission to impose any charge for water withdrawals or diversions from the
Basin if such withdrawals or diversions could lawfully have been made without
charge on the effective date of the Compact .... ." Delaware River Basin Com-
pact of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-328, § 15.1(b), 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
7. 641 F.2d at 1089. Section 5.1-2 of Resolution 74-6 provides that a
charge for water shall be levied against "[a]ny person, firm, corporation or other
entity . . . who shall use, withdraw or divert surface waters of the Delaware
River Basin". Delaware River Basin Comm'n v. Bucks County Water & Sewer
Auth., 474 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated, 641 F.2d 1087 (3d
Cir. 1981). The Commission had previously authorized the implementation
of such a system of charges when it passed Resolution 71-4 in 1971. 641 F.2d
at 1089.
8. 641 F.2d at 1089. The purpose of levying water use charges was to
finance the construction of water storage capabilities at the Blue Marsh and
Beltzville Reservoirs. Id. at 1089 n.4, citing Borough of Morrisville v. Dela-
ware River Basin Comm'n, 399 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Pa. 1975), afl'd per curiam,
532 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1976). In Morrisville, seven municipal water users
challenged the authority of the Commission to enact Resolution 74-6. 399
F. Supp. at 472. Conceding that the Compact did not explicitly authorize
water charges, the Morrisville court nevertheless held that the charges were
in fact for water storage services at Commission facilities and authorized un-
der § 3.7. Id. at 474. The plaintiffs claimed that they derived no benefit
from the increased storage capacity of the facilities as all but one of them
were downstream of the reservoirs. Id. at 472. The court, however, accepted
the Commission's argument that the Basin should be viewed as a single pool
of water with each user benefiting from its enlargement, regardless of whether
the water stored in the reservoir actually benefits the user. Id. at 471. For
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effect to the congressional limitation set forth in section 15.1(b) of
the Compact by exempting from water charges those users who with-
drew water "in quantities not exceeding the legal entitlement of the
user" as of the effective date of the Compact.9 "Legal entitlement"
was defined as the lesser of the water quantity a user was authorized
by state permit to withdraw, the user's pumping capacity, or the al-
locable flow of the River.10
In 1966, the City of Philadelphia contracted with the Bucks County
Water & Sewer Authority (Authority) to supply the Authority with
35,000,000 gallons of water per day." In 1976, the Commission re-
quested, unsuccessfully, that the City bill the Authority for water
charges under Resolution 74-6.12 When the Commission subsequently
sought to collect the charges directly, the Authority refused payment,
claiming an exemption under 74-6.13 As a result, the Commission
brought an action against both the Authority and the City of Phila-
delphia in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
9. 641 F.2d at 1089-90.
10. Id. at 1090, 1097. Section 5-1.3(b)(1) of Resolution 74-6 defines "legal
entitlement" as follows:
1. "Legal entitlement" means the quantity or volume of water ex-
pressed in million gallons per month determined by the lesser of the
following conditions:
(i) a valid and subsisting permit, issued under the authority
of one of the signatory parties, if such permit was required as of
October 27, 1961, or thereafter;
(ii) physical capability as required for such taking; or
(iii) the total allocable flow without augmentation by the
Commission, using a seven-day, ten-year, low-flow criterion meas-
ured at the point of withdrawal or diversion.
641 F.2d at 1090, quoting Resolution 74-6.
11. 641 F.2d at 1090. The Authority submitted the contract to the Com-
mission for approval pursuant to § 3.8 of the Compact. Id. Section 3.8 of
the Compact requires Commission endorsement of any project "having a sub-
stantial effect on the water resources of the [B]asin." Id., quoting Delaware
River Basin Compact of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-328, § 3.8, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
The Commission reported that § 3.8 did not require review of the contract.
641 F.2d at 1090. The City began delivering water to the Authority in 1970,
and has done so corttinually since that time. Id.
12. 641 F.2d at 1090. The City refused on the grounds that it did not want
to function as a "collection agency" for the Commission. Id.
13. Id. In a letter to the Authority, the Commission claimed the Authority
was not entitled to Basin water free of charge and requested the Authority to
remit money owed under Resolution 74-6. Id. The Authority refused pay-
ment on the grounds that the water it purchased could have been withdrawn
by the City without charge on the effective date of the Compact and thus
fell within the "legal entitlement" exemption of Resolution 74-6. Id.
[VOL. 27: p. 616
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Pennsylvania.' 4 Granting the Commission's motion for summary judg-
ment,1 5 the court held that the Authority was not entitled to an ex-
emption from water use charges and that section 15.1(b) of the Com-
pact, as implemented by Resolution 74-6, did not violate the principle
of equal protection.16
On appeal,'7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit 18 vacated and remanded,19 holding that Resolution 74-6 vio-
lated the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws because
it had not been demonstrated to be rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. Delaware River Basin Commission v. Bucks
County Water & Sewer Authority, 641 F.2d 1087 (3d Cir. 1981).
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that "[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 20 The United States
14. Delaware River Basin Comm'n v. Bucks County Water & Sewer Auth.,
474 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated, 641 F.2d 1087 (3d Cir. 1981). The
Commission sought payment of water charges under Resolution 74-6. 474
F. Supp. at 1251. The City crossclaimed against the Authority for indemnifica-
tion in the event that the City was held liable to the Commission. Id. The
Commission made a motion for summary judgment against the City and the
Authority. Id. The defendants, in turn, moved for summary judgment against
the Commission. Id.
15. 641 F.2d at 1090. The district court entered summary judgment against
both the Authority and the City, and granted the City's request for indemnifica-
tion. Id. at 1090 n.6.
16. Id. at 1090. The district court found that the Authority did not have
a legal permit to withdraw water in 1961, and that the City's permit did not
contemplate resale to outlying municipalities. Id. After conceding that the
legislative intent behind the enactment of § 15.1(b) was unclear, the district court
reasoned that the exemption of those uses previously authorized under state
law was a reasonable legislative classification that did not violate the principles
of equal protection. Delaware River Basin Comm'n v. Bucks County Water
& Sewer Auth., 474 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated, 641 F.2d 1087
(3d Cir. 1981). The court concluded that it was reasonable for Congress to
distinguish between pre-1961 users of the Basin and subsequent users since
Congress "may well have supposed" that the Delaware River met the region's
water use needs in 1961. 474 F. Supp. at 1255. Therefore, according to the
district court, projects that the Commission undertook in order to enlarge the
water supply after 1961 could be interpreted as a response to the needs of
post-1961 users. Id. For a further discussion of the district court's rationale
regarding the objectives of § 15.1(b) and Resolution 74-6, see note 66 and ac-
companying text infra.
17. 641 F.2d 1087. The Authority limited its challenge to the equal pro-
tection issue and argued that Resolution 74-6 implemented the "grandfather
provision" of § 15.1(b) of the Compact in an unconstitutional manner. Id.
For a discussion of the Authority's position, see note 55 and accompanying
text infra.
18. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Adams and Sloviter, and by
Judge Brotman of the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, sitting by designation. Judge Adams wrote the majority opinion and
Judge Brotman dissented. The opinions were filed on February 18, 1981.
19. 641 F.2d at 1100. The Third Circuit remanded to provide the Com-
mission with an additional opportunity to demonstrate the rationality of Reso-
lution 74-6. Id.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4
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Supreme Court has held that the fifth amendment's due process clause
imposes the same obligation upon the federal government.21 When
reviewing equal protection challenges to legislation, the Supreme Court
has defined three different standards of review; their use depends upon
the classification and the interest affected by the legislation.22 When
21. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The Supreme Court inter-
preted the due process clause of the fifth amendment to forbid unjustifiable
discrimination by the federal government. Id. at 499. See also Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (equal protection analysis under
the fifth amendment is the same as under the fourteenth amendment); John-
son v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364 n.4 (1974) (classification which is invalid
under the fourteenth amendment is also inconsistent with fifth amendment
due process). See generally Comment, Federalism and a New Equal Pro-
tection, 24 VILL. L. REV. 557, 557-76 (1979).
22. See generally Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law:
Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049 (1979);
Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949);
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
The Supreme Court has reviewed equal protection challenges under three
different standards: the rational basis test; intermediate or "middle-tier" scru-
tiny; and strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 994-1133 (1978). Strict scrutiny has been applied, in general, to classifica-
tions based on a suspect class and those which infringe fundamental interests,
and requires that a classification be necessary to the achievement of a com-
pelling state interest. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
(alienage is a suspect class, thus strict scrutiny applied); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel is a fundamental right, thus strict scrutiny
applied); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (strict
scrutiny applied in determining validity of state poll tax since right to vote
is a fundamental right). Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (strict
scrutiny applied to classifications based on race).
The intermediate standard of review has been applied when the court
reviewed "important" but not "fundamental" interests or "sensitive" but not
"suspect" classifications and requires that the classification be substantially
related to the achievement of an important state purpose. See, e.g., Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (classification based on illegitimacy subject
to intermediate scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender-based
classification subject to intermediate scrutiny). See also Fox, Equal Protection
Analysis: Laurence Tribe, the Middle Tier, and the Role of the Court. 14
U.S.F.L. REV. 525 (1980).
Justice Marshall has suggested that in actuality the Supreme Court em-
ploys a "sliding scale," the standards of which vary with the nature of the clas-
sification and interest impinged on. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 97-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). He contends
that the Court's decisions reveal application of a variety of standards and sug-
gests that a flexible approach should be explicitly adopted under which the
degree of scrutiny would vary with the societal and constitutional importance of
the adversely affected interest and recognized invidiousness of the discrimination.
See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317-27
(1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 97-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U,S. 471, 508-30 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 27: p. 616
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the challenged regulation has affected only economic interests and has
neither burdened fundamental rights 23 nor has been based upon suspect
classifications, 24 the Court has applied the rational basis test. 25  To
satisfy the rational basis test the legislation 26 must have a legitimate
purpose 27 and the classification used in the statute must be rationally
related to the achievement of that purpose. 28 Under the rational basis
23. For a discussion of the analysis applicable to fundamental rights, see
note 22 supra.
24. For a discussion of the analysis applicable to suspect classifications, see
note 22 supra.
25. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980)
(rational basis test applied to restructuring of retirement benefits); New Or-
leans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (rational basis test applied to ordinance
prohibiting street vendors); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307 (1976) (rational basis test applied to state statute specifying a manda-
tory retirement age). See also Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Un-
derenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1215-18 (1978).
The "rational basis test" took recognizable form in Gulf Colo. 8c S.F. Ry. v.
Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). In Gulf, the Court stated that in order for a
legislative classification to be valid under the equal protection clause, the
classification must be "based upon some reasonable ground-some difference
which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification-and is
not a mere arbitrary selection." Id. at 165-66. This idea developed into a
classic, but now discarded formulation of the test employed in F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). The Royster Court stated that "[a]
classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."
Id. at 415. The standard currently employed by the Court is more relaxed,
requiring only a rational relationship. See United States R.R. Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). See also notes 32-43 and accompanying text
infra.
26. See Developments, supra note 22, at 1076-87. In order to identify the
purpose of a statute, a court will ordinarily consider its language, the stated
purpose, legislative history, related public pronouncements and public knowl-
edge. See Bennett, supra note 22, at 1070-77. The author noted that this
is a difficult task, particularly when the purpose is not articulated, when the
statute itself is multipurposed, or when the statute is enacted by legislators
who had numerous or conflicting purposes. Id. For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's approach in the absence of an articulated purpose, see notes
33-36 and accompanying text infra.
27. See Bennett, supra note 22, at 1070, 1077-88. The purpose must not be
explicitly or implicitly prohibited by the Constitution. Id. at 1077. A dis-
criminatory purpose or the intent to confer unjustifiable benefits is not legiti-
mate. Id. See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
533 (1973). In Moreno, the challenged statute limited participation in the
federal food stamp program to households of related persons. Id. at 528-33.
The legislative history disclosed that the purpose of the classification was to
prevent "hippies" from participating in the food stamp program. Id. at 534-35.
The Moreno Court held that "a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate purpose." Id. at 534 (emphasis
supplied by the Court). For a general discussion of discriminatory legisla-
tion, see Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 22, at 357-61.
28. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166
(1980); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See generally Tussman
ge tenBroek, supra note 22, at 341-56. It should be noted that the Court has
1981-82]
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test, enactments of Congress and other legislative bodies are presumed
constitutional and the burden rests on those challenging the classifica-
tion to demonstrate the absence of a rational relationship.29 The
Court has shown great deference to legislative classifications under this
standard30 by consistently refusing to invalidate, on equal protection
grounds, legislation which it deemed merely unwise or inartfully
drawn.3 '
In determining the purpose of a legislative classification, courts
have traditionally examined the stated purpose and the legislative his-
tory of the enactment.32 In the absence of an articulated purpose,
occasionally used the following words as alternative formulations of the ration-
ality requirement: "arbitrary"; "capricious"; and "invidious". See, e.g., Jef-
ferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972) (provision of lower welfare bene-
fits to AFDC recipients than to aged is not "invidious" violation of equal
protection); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 115 (1966) (civil commitment
following prison sentence without jury review available to all others is
"capricious" violation of equal protection); Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep.
School Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 385 (1960) (states' discretion to classify may not be
palpably "arbitrary").
29. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 101 S. Ct. 715, 724
(1981); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). Clover Leaf Creamery involved a challenge to
Minnesota's statute banning the sale of milk in plastic, nonreturnable contain-
ers, but allowing its sale in nonplastic, nonreturnable containers. 101 S. Ct.
at 721-22. The Court stressed that the essential question was whether a legis-
lature could rationally have decided that the purposes of resource conserva-
tion would be furthered by this type of statute. Id. at 724. Thus, the Court
could find the classification constitutional regardless of whether the purposes
sought were, in fact,- furthered by the classification. Id. Similarly, in
McGowan, Chief Justice Warren declared, in now famous dictum, that: "a
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it." 366 U.S. at 426.
30. L. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 994-96. For a further discussion of the
rational basis standard of review, see notes 37-54 and accompanying text infra.
Notwithstanding the presumption of constitutionality under minimal scrutiny,
Justice Brennan has noted that the "rational basis standard 'is not a tooth-
less one' and will not be satisfied by flimsy or implausible justifications for
the legislative classification." United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166, 184 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting), citing Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
31. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175
(1980); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). For a discussion of Fritz,
see notes 51-54 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Dukes, see
notes 46-50 and accompanying text infra. The Dukes Court stated that:
The judiciary may not sit as a super-legislature to judge the wis-
dom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas
that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect
lines. . . . [I]n the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious
discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand con-
sistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.
427 U.S. at 303-04 (citations omitted).
32. See Bennett, supra note 22, at 1073. For a discussion of the various
approaches for determining legislative purpose, see note 24 supra. See also
Developments, supra note 20, at 1077.
[VOL. 27: p. 616
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courts have hypothesized purposes 33 or accepted purposes postulated by
the parties.8 4  In Flemming v. Nestor,5 Justice Harlan approved of
judicial speculation as to legislative purpose, indicating that it was
"constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the
legislative decision." 86
Once a statutory purpose is identified, the court must determine
whether the classification is a rational or reasonable means to accomplish
it.37 In Dandridge v. Williams,38 the Court indicated that the creation
of classifications in economic regulations is an unavoidable and pecul-
iarly legislative task and stated that perfection in such a task is neither
possible nor necessary.8 9 Under the rational basis test, the Court has
33. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
179 (1980); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972); Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960); Developments, supra note 22, at 1080.
The practice of postulating a purpose has not been without criticism. See
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 186-93 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In Fritz, Justice Brennan suggested that when a legislative purpose
is unarticulated, the resulting post hoc justifications should be viewed with
skepticism. Justice Brennan further suggested that the actual, not the hypo-
thetical purpose, should be examined. Id. at 186-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S. Ct. 1074, 1085-89 (1981) (Powell, J., dis-
senting). In Schweiher, Justice Powell maintained that when there is no
indication of legislative purpose in the legislative history, the court should
require that the classification bear a "fair and substantial relation" to the
asserted purpose. Id. at 1088 (Powell, J., dissenting). Three other members
of the court-Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens-agreed with Justice
Powell's analysis. Id. at 1085 (Powell, J., dissenting).
34. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
179 (1980); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972); Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960). One commentator has observed: "How far a court
will go in attributing a purpose . . . depends upon its imaginative powers and
its devotion to a theory of judicial restraint." Developments, supra note 22,
at 1080. Another commentator has suggested that it is almost always possible
to uphold a classification by hypothesizing an appropriate purpose, or by de-
fining the purpose so that the classification is rationally related to it. Note,
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123,
128-35 (1972). The Supreme Court has, nonetheless, been criticized for in-
validating legislation on rational basis grounds by ignoring purposes which
were readily inferable from the statute or legislative history. See Bice, Stand-
ards of Judicial Review Under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses,
50 S. CAL. L. REV. 689, 698-700 (1977).
35. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
36. Id. at 612. Justice Harlan hypothesized that Congressional legislation
denying social security benefits to certain deportees could be supported by a
justification that benefits sent abroad will not add to overall national purchasing
power. Id.
37. For a discussion of the degree of relationship a classification must have
to the legislative purpose under the rational basis test, see notes 39-54 and
accompanying text infra.
38. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
39. Id. at 485-86. Dandridge involved a claim that certain Maryland
welfare legislation violated principles of equal protection. The Dandridge
Court stated:
In the area of economics and social welfare a State does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause merely because classifications made by its
8
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consistently upheld classifications which are overinclusive or underin-
clusive in relation to their purposes.40 Similarly, the Court has held
that the means is rationally related to the legislative purpose if it
tends to accomplish it to the slightest degree.41 In explaining the
deference due the legislature under the rational basis test, the Court,
in Vance v. Bradley,42 stated: "The Constitution presumes that . . .
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no
matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted." 4
"Grandfather clauses" exempt those who have engaged in an activity
as of a given date from the effect of a new regulation." 44 These clauses
have often been challenged on equal protection grounds and the Su-
preme Court has reviewed grandfather clauses involving purely eco-
laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis,"
it does not offend the Constitution simply because the "classification
is not made with mathematical nicety or in practice it results in some
inequality."
Id. at 485, citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas, 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
40. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297 (1976); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See also
Tussman &c tenBroek, supra note 22, at 344-53, 368-80. Although equal pro-
tection generally requires that persons similarly situated be similarly treated,
it does not require perfection in this goal. See id. See also Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. at 485-86. An overinclusive classification includes not only
persons at whom the law is aimed, but also persons not necessary to achieve-
ment of the legislative purpose. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 22, at
351-52. An underinclusive classification includes only persons at whom the
purpose of the law is aimed, but fails to include all such persons. Id. at
348-51. Administrative feasibility concerns, legislative convenience, and politi-
cal considerations justify overinclusiveness as well as underinclusiveness, under
the rational basis test. Id. A classification may be simultaneously underinclu-
sive and overinclusive. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); notes 42 Sc 43
and accompanying text infra.
41. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809
(1961); Railway Express Agency Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 105, 109-10 (1949);
Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947). One com-
mentator has stated that, at a minimum, "rationality" is satisfied when a positive
relationship exists between means and ends. Bice, Rationality Analysis in Con-
stitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1980).
42. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
43. Id. at 97. In Bradley, it was argued that mandatory retirement at age
sixty for foreign service employees, without a similar requirement for civil
service employees, violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 95-96. The
Court held that the classification furthered the congressional purpose of re-
moving older, less dependable, employees from rigorous positions in the foreign
service. Id. at 108-12. The Court acknowledged that the classification may
have been simultaneously overinclusive and underinclusive, but indicated this
was justified by convenience and political realities and that mathematical pre-
cision in drawing the classification was not required. Id. at 101-02 8c 109.
44. A "grandfather provision" is a "provision in a new law or regulation
exempting those already in or a part of the existing system which is being
regulated." BLACK'S LAW DicrIONARY 629 (5th ed. 1979).
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nomic regulations under the rational basis test.45 In New Orleans v.
Dukes,46 the Court upheld an ordinance which banned all pushcart
vendors in the French Quarter of New Orleans, except those vendors
who had conducted business in the Quarter for the previous eight years
or more.47 The Court held that the classification was rationally related
to the legislature's purpose of enhancing the charm and beauty of the
historic French Quarter.48 Recognizing that the older vendors had
made business plans in reliance upon the law prior to the enactment
of the ordinance, the Court indicated that the legislature, in adopting a
gradual approach to the problem, 49 could rationally consider these reli-
ance interests.5 0
Similarly, in United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,5 '
the Court upheld a grandfather provision which allowed persons who
were railroad employees as of 1974 to continue to receive both social se-
curity and railroad retirement benefits.5 2 Applying the rational basis
45. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166(1980); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); United States v. Maryland
Savings-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4 (1970).
The Supreme Court employed the rational basis test in reviewing a grand-
father provision in Maryland Savings-Share. See 400 U.S. at 4. The Court
upheld tax exemptions granted to nonprofit corporations which insured savings
institutions and which had been in existence as of September 1, 1957. Id.
The Court found a rational basis in the articulated purpose of protecting the
stability of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation by discourag-
ing competitive corporations. Id. at 5-6.
46. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
47. Id. at 304-05. The court in Dukes applied the rational basis test to
the grandfather provision of the ordinance. Id. For a discussion of the rational
basis test as employed in Dukes, see note 31 supra. The Dukes Court noted
that only once in the past fifty years had the Supreme Court held that a
purely economic regulation failed to satisfy the rational basis test. 427 U.S.
at 306, citing Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). In Morey, an Illinois
statute regulated businesses which sold money orders, but specifically exempted
the American Express Company from the regulation. 354 U.S. at 458-63. The
Dukes Court expressly overruled Morey, stating that "we are now satisfied the
decision was erroneous." 427 U.S. at 306.
48. 427 U.S. at 303-06.
49. Id. The Court indicated that a legislature is not required to strike
at all evils at the same time; a gradual approach to a problem is permissible.
Id. The, legislature may adopt regulations that only partially ameliorate a
perceived evil and defer complete elimination of the evil to some future time.
Id.
50. Id. at 305-06. The city could rationally choose to eliminate only
vendors of recent vintage, rather than immediately prohibit all vendors. Id.
at 305. The Court suggested that the two older vendors exempted from regu-
lation might reasonably be considered "part of the distinctive character and
charm" of the French Quarter. Id.
51. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
52. Id. at 174. A person who, prior to 1974, had worked for both railroad
and nonrailroad employers and qualified for both railroad retirement and
social security benefits, would receive benefits under both systems. Id. at 168.
In 1974, Congress eliminated these dual benefits, except for certain classes of
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test,53 the Court held that Congress, in pursuing its purpose of phasing
out dual benefits, could properly consider the equitable claims of active
employees to those benefits and tailor the legislation accordingly.54
It was against this background that the Delaware River Basin court
considered the Authority's claim that the implementation of section
15.1(b) of the Compact through Resolution 74-6 violated constitutional
principles of equal protection.55 The Third Circuit began its analysis
by deciding that the proper standard of review for the purely economic
regulation at issue was the rational basis test.56 After setting forth that
test's requirements,5 7 the court attempted to identify the purposes un-
derlying section 15.1(b) of the Compact and Resolution 74-6. Upon
examination of the Compact, its legislative history,58 and the back-
53. Id. at 174-76. The Supreme Court in Fritz candidly admitted that it
had not, in past decisions, applied a uniform or consistent test under the
equal protection clause. Id. at 174, 176-77, n.10. For a discussion of earlier
or alternate formulations of the rational basis test, see notes 22, 25 & 28 supra.
The Fritz Court indicated that it felt obliged to apply the "equal protection
components of the constitution" as it believed the Constitution required. 449
U.S. at 177, n.10. Moreover, it concluded that the proper application of the
rational basis test for social or economic regulations was set forth in Jefferson
v. Hackney, Dandridge v. Williams, and Fritz. Id., citing Jefferson v. Hack-
ney, 406 U.S. 435 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). For a
discussion of Dandridge, see notes 38 & 39 and accompanying text supra.
54. 449 U.S. at 177-80. The Fritz Court hypothesized that Congress could
have concluded that active employees had a greater equitable claim to such
benefits and were more likely to be career railroad employees. Id. at 178.
55. 641 F.2d at 1091. The Authority's constitutional challenge was not
framed directly against § 15.1(b) of the Compact, but rather against the imple-
mentation of § 15.1(b) through Resolution 74-6. Id. For the relevant text of§ 15.1(b) and Resolution 74-6, see notes 6, 7 & 10 supra. Similarly, the Authority
did not contend that the Commission exceeded its powers in enacting Resolu-
tion 74-6. 641 F.2d at 1091.
56. 641 F.2d at 1092. The court concluded that "[s]ince Resolution 74-6
neither apportions benefits and burdens on the basis of a 'suspect classification'
nor impinges on 'fundamental interests,'" only minimal judicial scrutiny was
required. Id. For a discussion of the scrutiny standards and their applicability
to equal protection analysis, see note 22 supra. Although neither party
suggested that a distinction between legislative and administrative action might
be made, The Delaware River Basin court noted that, even when the chal-
lenged classification is devised by an administrative rather than a legislative
body, the courts generally apply conventional equal protection analysis. 641
F.2d at 1093 n.ll. The court suggested, however, that this might be inap-
propriate because of the absence of democratic safeguards in the administrative
process. Id.
57. See 641 F.2d at 1092-98, citing United States R.R. -Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); United
States v. Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4 (1970); Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). The Third Circuit stated that the equal pro-
tection analysis would be the same whether the challenge was viewed as against
Congress or the signatory states because the same standard of review has been
applied under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 641 F.2d at 1092 n.8.
58. 641 F.2d at 1093. The legislative history disclosed only that Congress
added § 15 as an absolute precondition to federal participation in the Coin-
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ground concerning the adoption of Resolution 74-6, 59 the court con-
cluded that neither Congress nor the Commission had articulated a
legitimate goal that was furthered by "exempting certain users of Basin
waters from the charges shouldered by others." 60
The Third Circuit acknowledged that in the absence of an articu-
lated purpose courts have upheld challenged classifications on the basis
of goals suggested by the parties involved or by the reviewing court
itself.01 The court, however, questioned the propriety of such specu-
lation,6 2 particularly in cases involving grandfather provisions, which
the court stated may result from political favoritism.63 Nevertheless,
it declined to hold that an articulated purpose was an absolute precon-
pact "in order to provide minimum protection of federal interests". Id., citing
S. REP. No. 985, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1961) (reporting that the "purpose of
the amendment is merely to clarify the intent of section 3.7 of the Compact").
For additional legislative history of the Compact, see H.R. REP. No. 310, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961); S. REP. No. 854, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961); S.
REP. No. 1032, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961).
59. 641 F.2d at 1093-94. The Commission had indicated its reasons for
adopting water charges in a public notice, but failed to indicate the purpose
of the exemptions. Id. The underlying rationale for water use charges as
set forth in the Commission's public notice was the "pooled water" concept,
which conceives of all users, regardless of location, as receiving a benefit from
an increase in the water supply. Id. For a discussion of the reasons for
adopting water charges and the "pooled water" concept, see note 8 supra. The
Third Circuit deemed the "pooled water" concept to be unrelated, and per-
haps even contrary to exempting established users from charges. 641 F.2d at
1094.
60. 641 F.2d at 1094.
61. 641 F.2d at 1096-97. The court relied on Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603 (1960), as the clearest expression of this viewpoint. Id. For a dis-
cussion of Flemming, see notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
62. 641 F.2d at 1095-97. The court suggested that the Supreme Court has
emphasized actual or articulated purposes in recent years. Id. at 1094-96. See,
e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (classification
must further a "legitimate, articulated purpose"); McGinnis v. Royster, 410
U.S. 263, 270 (1973) (purpose must be "legitimate and nonillusory").
63. 641 F.2d at 1095-97. In particular, the court viewed United States v.
Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp., a case involving a grandfather provision,
as emphasizing the importance of articulating legislative purpose. Id. at 1095,
citing United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4 (1970).
For a discussion of Maryland Savings-Share, see note 44 supra. The Delaware
River Basin court observed that the Supreme Court in Maryland Savings-Share
distinguished Mayflower Farms Inc. v. TenEyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936), a depres-
sion era case in which the Court had struck down a similar grandfather pro-
vision in a milk price control act, by noting that, in the latter case, there
had been no affirmative showing of a valid purpose in the legislative history.
641 F.2d at 1095-96, citing Mayflower Farms Inc. v. TenEyck, 297 U.S. 266
(1936).
The Third Circuit suggested that a grandfather provision presents a
strong probability of resulting from political favoritism rather than from rea-
soned judgments about social policy. 641 F.2d at 1095-96. The court felt the
danger of political favoritism was especially great in the instant case, where
the regulation was enacted for the benefit of the regulated group and not the
general public. Id. The court also suggested that the interests of politically
powerful users, such as the City of Philadelphia, had overborne the interests
of more modest users in the formulation of the Resolution. Id. at 1096 n.19.
1981-82]
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dition to validity 64 and proceeded to analyze the purpose that was
postulated by the district court.6
The Third Circuit set forth the district court's hypothesis that
Congress, in adding section 15.1(b) to the Compact, was motivated by the
belief that the Basin met the water use needs of the region as of 1961
and that "most Commission projects aimed at enlarged and more equita-
ble water allocation would be geared to meeting needs developing
after the effective date of the Compact." 66 Assuming arguendo that
the system of charges and exemptions was designed to allocate Com-
mission costs to users whose demands arose after 1961, 6 7 the Delaware
River Basin court examined whether Resolution 74-6 was rationally re-
lated to that goal.6
The court observed that under Resolution 74-6, an established
user, possessing a valid permit, could increase his actual usage well be-
yond 1961 levels, thereby benefiting from the increased water supply,
and yet remain exempt from charges so long as the increased diversions
did not exceed his "legal entitlement." 69 For this reason, the court
64. 641 F.2d at 1096. The court felt that a recent statement of the Su-
preme Court which implicitly approved of hypothesizing of legislative purposes
was controlling. Id., citing United States R.R. Retirement Bd. V. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166 (1980). Although Fritz did not address this issue, the Court in
Fritz cited a case in which such hypothesizing was allowed, as an example of
the proper rational basis scrutiny. 449 U.S. at 166, citing Jefferson v. Hack-
ney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). For a discussion of Fritz, see notes 51-54 and accom-
panying text supra.
65. 641 F.2d at 1097. The court indicated that consideration of various
hypothetical goals would be permissible as long as the court did not "attribute
to the legislature purposes which it [could not] reasonably be understood to
have entertained." Id. The court noted that "when a legislature has decided
not to pursue a certain goal, upholding the statute on the basis of that goal
is not properly deference [sic] to a legislative decision at all; it is deference
to a decision the legislature could have made but did not." Id. at 1097 n.21,
quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 520 n.l1 (1975) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis in original).
66. 641 F.2d at 1097, quoting Delaware River Basin Comm'n v. Bucks
County Water &c Sewer Auth., 474 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (E.D. Pa. 1979) vacated,
641 F.2d 1087 (3d Cir. 1981). The Third Circuit did not strictly adhere to
the district court's proposed justification and ascribed to the grandfather pro-
vision the following purposes, each being slightly different: 1) apportioning
charges in relation to benefits; 2) distributing costs of Commission projects to
users whose demands arose after 1961; 3) shielding established users from costs
incurred in meeting needs of post 1961 users; 4) having those users who have
increased water usage pay for projects undertaken to meet those demands; 5)
fair allocation of costs; and 6) conservation and equitable resource manage-
ment. 641 F.2d at 1097-98 & n.23.
67. 641 F.2d at 1097. The Third Circuit acknowledged that the district
court's hypothesis might be an appropriate goal in theory, but doubted whether
this purpose explained the resolution, suggesting that in its estimation, all
users benefited from an increased water supply. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1097-98. According to the Third Circuit, the City of Philadel-
phia, an original party to the suit, provided a case in point. Id. Since
the City's actual usage has never approached its legal entitlement, the City
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concluded that the manner in which Resolution 74-6 exempted estab-
lished users was arbitrary and not related to the suggested purpose of
apportioning charges in relation to benefits. 7 0 Perceiving no reliance
interest in the free enjoyment of amounts of water exceeding 1961 actual
usage,71 nor any indication that the exemption was a gradual approach
to the problem,72 the Third Circuit rejected the argument that these
principles, as applied in Dukes, should yield a different result.78
The Delaware River Basin court next addressed the Commission's
assertion that the purpose of the exemption was the preservation of
existing rights to the free withdrawal of water. 74 The court held that
such a purpose could not be reconciled with the Commission's authority
to supersede state allocation systems and, therefore, could not have been
an unarticulated motive for the exemptions of section 15.1(b).75 More-
over, the court found that such a purpose was fundamentally objec-
tionable in that it was no more than a tautological restatement of the
classification itself.70
has been free to increase usage without charge under Resolution 74-6. Id.
Thus, the court posited that if the City were to divert the water it sold the
Authority to uses arising within the City, no charges would be imposed. Id.
at 1098 n.23.
70. Id. at 1099. The court implied that if the grandfather provision had
been based on actual usage as of 1961, rather than criteria such as pumping
capacity and water permits, the provision would have been rationally related
to the purpose suggested. Id. at 1097-99. For a discussion of judge Brotman's
criticism of this part of the majority opinion, see notes 82-84 and accompanying
text infra.
71. 641 F.2d at 1099. The court stated that "[w]hile a user arguably has
a reliance interest in continuing to withdraw, free of charge, the amount of
Basin water diverted before the Compact became effective, we perceive no
reliance interest in the free enjoyment of an amount exceeding actual us-
age". Id.
72. Id. at 1098-99. Although the court acknowledged that a gradual ap-
proach to solving a problem has been held to justify grandfather provisions,
it indicated that it would involve sheer speculation to view Resolution 74-6
as anything other than a permanent exemption. Id.
73. Id. For a discussion of Dukes, see notes 42-46 and accompanying text
supra.
74. 641 F.2d at 1099. The Commission suggested that the purpose of
§ 15.1(b) was to protect those political entities who had obtained permits to
withdraw or divert Basin water from any charges which the passage of the
Compact might entail. Id.
75. Id. The terms of the Compact granted the Commission the authority
to override any previously developed state allocation systems through the regu-
lation and control of withdrawals and diversions. Id. A user's pre-1961
rights to the enjoyment of water might, therefore, have to yield to the Com-
mission's regulations. Id. Thus, the court held that the Compact itself belied
any suggestion that the preservation of existing rights was an unarticulated
motive for the grandfather provision. Id.
76. Id. at 1099-100. The court stated that a statute's classifications will in-
variably be related to a purpose, when the purpose is defined in terms which
are, in effect, a restatement of the classification. Id. The Delaware River
1981-82]
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The Third Circuit concluded that Resolution 74-6 could not sur-
vive equal protection challenge on the basis of the rationale presented
to it. 77 Rather than grant final disposition, the court decided that
remand would serve a useful function. 78 The court reasoned that the
Commission should have an additional opportunity to offer a rational
purpose for the Resolution, and that other affected Basin water users
should be encouraged to intervene in the lawsuit. 79
In a dissenting opinion,8 0 Judge Brotman maintained that the
grandfather provision was rationally related to the purpose suggested
by the district court, that of exempting those pre-1961 users who did
not benefit from increased water supply from the water use charges.81
Judge Brotman indicated that the majority conceded the constitution-
ality of exempting established users up to their actual usage, but found
Basin court objected to the Commission's suggested purpose, stating that to
engage in such hypothesizing would render the rational basis standard meaning-
less. Id. The court continued:
[I]f the analysis of a legislative purpose requires only a reading of
the statutory language in a disputed provision, and if any "conceiv-
able basis" for a discriminatory classification will repel a constitu-
tional attack on the statute, judicial review will constitute a mere
tautological recognition of the fact that Congress did what it intended
to do.
Id., quoting United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
77. 641 F.2d at 1100. The court stated that it was unable to conceive of
any additional satisfactory rationale for the grandfather provision, other than
those already considered. Id. Since Resolution 74-6 had not been demon-
strated to have been rationally related to the attainment of a legitimate state
purpose, the court could not sustain the resolution against constitutional chal-
lenge. Id.
78. Id. Although the judgment was against the Commission, the Commis-
sion argued for final judgment, maintaining that no further evidence of the
purposes underlying § 15.1(b), adopted nearly twenty years ago, could now be
advanced. Id.
79. Id. The court realized that any modification of Resolution 74-6 would
adversely affect other Basin water users and indicated that it would be helpful
if these interested parties had an opportunity to advance their arguments for
maintaining the Resolution's exemptions. Id.
80. Id. at 1101-02 (Brotman, J., dissenting). Judge Brotman concurred in
the application of the rational basis test because he viewed Resolution 74-6 as
a purely economic regulation which neither affected fundamental rights nor
utilized suspect classifications. Id. According to Judge Brotman, the sole
question before the court was who must pay the Commission for water with-
drawn from the Basin. Id.
81. Id. at 1100-02 (Brotman, J., dissenting). Judge Brotman, who agreed
with the district court's analysis, maintained that the exemption of established
users from charges used to finance the construction of reservoirs was perfectly
rational since these users received no benefit from the increased water supply.
Id. Although agreeing that it would have been preferable for Congress to
have articulated its purposes, judge Brotman considered it impractical to insist
that Congress provide a justification for every subsection of a statute. Id. at
1102 n.3 (Brotman, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 27: p. 616
15
Editors: Constitutional Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
the slightly greater exemptions of Resolution 74-6 irrational.8 2 Ac-
cording to Judge Brotman, the equal protection guarantee "does not
draw such nice distinctions." 83 Conceding that the system adopted
may not have been the best or most equitable means of financing in-
creases in water storage capabilities, Judge Brotman stressed that the
precise scope of the exemption from charges was a matter of legislative
concern.M Accordingly, he cautioned the court "not to open the door
towards a return to the era in which courts were all too willing to allow
their economic opinions to color their judgments about matters of
constitutional law." 85
It is submitted that, while purporting to apply the minimum scru-
tiny of the rational basis test,8 6 the Delaware River Basin court in fact
required a stricter relationship between the classification and its as-
serted purpose than can be supported by current interpretations of the
rationality test.8 7 The court conceded that if the grandfather provi-
sion had been based upon 1961 actual usage, it would be rationally
related to the suggested purpose of apportioning water charges in re-
lation to benefits.8 8 But since Resolution 74-6 might exempt established
82. Id. at 1102 (Brotman, J., dissenting). Judge Brotman observed that
[t]he holding appears to be that the statute is constitutional insofar
as it allows prior users, such as Philadelphia, to continue withdraw-
ing water free of charge up to the amount of water they were actually
withdrawing in 1961, when the Compact became effective. The ma-
jority merely finds the statute unconstitutional in that it exempts prior
users from charges to a slightly greater extent-in an amount that is
the lesser of (a) the quantity authorized by a valid State permit is-
sued prior to 1961, (b) the physical capacity of the user's system to
withdraw water at that time, or (c) the total allocable flow at the point
of withdrawal.
Id.
judge Brotman also disagreed with the majority's finding that the ex-
empted users had no reliance interest in free withdrawal of amounts of water
in excess of their 1961 usage. Id. He maintained that these users had obvi-
ously relied on continued access to the Delaware, to the extent then authorized
by law, in building up their pumping capacity. Id. at 1102 n.4 (Brotman, J.,
dissenting).
83. Id. at 1102 (Brotman, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Id., citing Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled, United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
86. 641 F.2d at 1092. For a discussion of the court's assertion that it was
applying the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis test, see notes 56-57 and
accompanying text supra.
87. See notes 88-95 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the
rational basis test as applied by the Supreme Court, see notes 22-54 and accom-
panying text supra.
88. See 641 F.2d at 1097-98. The Third Circuit stated that the Resolution
was irrational in that it did not measure the exemption by actual usage but
instead utilized other criteria such as permits, pumping capacity and allocable
flow. Id.
The Delaware River Basin court defined the hypothetical purpose it was
testing in no less than six distinct ways. For a summary of these purposes see
1981-82]
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users to a slightly greater extent, for example, up to the 1961 pumping
capacity, the court concluded that the Commission had acted irration-
ally.8 9 It is submitted, however, that the precise amount of a benefit
or exemption is not a proper question for judicial consideration under
the rational basis test.9 0 The Supreme Court, in addressing the consti-
tutionality of "grandfather provisions" in Fritz and Dukes, has indi-
cated that classifications need not be drawn with "mathematical per-
fection," and that a court should not substitute its views concerning the
wisdom or desirability of the classification for that of the legislature.9 1
Although it is conceded that the classification drawn by the grand-
father provision of Resolution 74-6 may not be perfectly related to the
asserted purpose,9 2 recent Supreme Court opinions have reiterated the
fact that a fair amount of overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness in the
classification has been, and should be, tolerated under the rational basis
test.9 3
note 66 supra. The court ultimately compared the classification against a
purpose of requiring those who use more water after 1961 to pay for water
supply projects. 641 F.2d at 1098. It is submitted that, by using this state-
ment of the purpose, rather than a more liberal statement, the court ren-
dered it impossible to conclude that the classification was rational. For exam-
ple, if the effect of Resolution 74-6 is to impose most of the water use charges
upon those post-1961 users whose demands brought about the need for in-
creased Basin water capacity, then the resolution would seem rationally related
to purposes described as "apportioning charges in relation to benefits" or
"distributing costs of projects to users whose demands arose after 1961." The
resolution, however, would seem arbitrary, when compared against a purpose
described as "having those users who have increased water usage pay for Com-
mission projects." For the proposition that it is always possible to define a pur-
pose in such a way that the classification will not be rationally related to it,
see note 34 supra.
89. 641 F.2d at 1097-99. It is suggested that the Delaware River Basin
court, by rejecting an exemption based on pumping capacity or permit amount,
and implicitly approving an exemption based on actual usage, has in essence
required a perfect or exact relationship between the classification and its as-
serted purpose. See id.
90. See notes 39-42 and accompanying text supra. Typically a party alleges
that placing him in a particular class denies him the equal protection of the
laws. See Bennett, supra note 22, at 1060-62. The Delaware River Basin court
did not find that a separate classification for established users was unconsti-
tutional, but rather found that the Commission could not rationally exempt
them to the extent provided by Resolution 74-6. See 641 F.2d at 1097-99. For
a discussion of the court's reasoning, see notes 66-73 and accompanying text
supra.
91. For a discussion of Fritz, see notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of Dukes, see notes 46-50 and accompanying text supra.
92. See notes 66-70 8 87-90 and accompanying text supra. It is arguable
that the classification at issue is overinclusive in that it exempts established
users more than is necessary to achieve the purpose of shielding these users
from costs incurred in meeting the needs of post-1961 users. However, the
closest relationship between means and end is only required under higher levels
of judicial scrutiny. For a discussion of these standards, see note 22 supra.
93. See notes 37-43 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that
Resolution 74-6 furthers the end sought to some degree and that any overin-
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Moreover, it is submitted that the Commission, in establishing the
precise exemptions of Resolution 74-6, could rationally consider that
the pre-1961 users had relied on continued free access to the Delaware
River in building their 1961 pumping capacity. 94 Thus, the Resolu-
tion's criteria of the lesser of permit amount, pumping capacity, or
allocable flow are not arbitrary, but in fact have a rational basis.95
In its analysis, the Third Circuit suggested several factors which
may explain its reluctance to defer to the grandfather provision. 96 First,
neither Congress nor the Commisison had articulated its reasons for
the exemption of established users.97 Second, the resolution was pro-
mulgated by an administrative body whose decisions are less suscepti-
ble to review and correction by the democratic process than is a legis-
lative enactment. 98  Third, there were suggestions that politically
powerful users had influenced the decision making process.99 It is
submitted that although the Third Circuit purported to apply the
minimal scrutiny of the rational basis test, its concern over these factors
resulted in a more stringent level of review.10° Although there may
be theoretical justifications for heightened scrutiny under these cir-
clusiveness of the exemption might be justified on the basis of administrative
convenience or political considerations. For example, there may be difficulties
in calculating actual 1961 usage, or developing a method of computing this
figure to take into account changes in water use in preceding years or in-
creases in pumping capacity. For a discussion of overinclusiveness, see notes
40 & 43 supra.
94. See 641 F.2d at 1102 n.4 (Brotman, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
Judge Brotman's view of the established users' reliance interests, see note 82
supra.
95. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Dukes, these reliance interests
may be considered. For a discussion of Dukes, see notes 46-50 and accompany-
ing text supra.
96. See notes 97-99 and accompanying text infra.
97. See notes 62-64 and accompanying text supra. Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, Powell and Stevens have suggested that when there is no articulated
purpose, it might be appropriate to require a more substantial relationship
between legislative means and end. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S. Ct.
1074, 1085-89 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting); United States R.R. Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 188 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discus-
sion of the dissenting views in Schweiker and Fritz, see note 33 supra. How-
ever, despite the theoretical justifications for such a requirement, the Supreme
Court has implicitly rejected this suggestion made by the dissenting Justices.
See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S. Ct. 1074 (1981); United States R.R. Re-
tirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). For a discussion of the Supreme
Court's willingness to utilize hypothetical purposes in rational basis analysis,
see notes 32-36 and accompanying text supra.
98. See note 56 supra.
99. See note 63 supra.
100. See notes 86-93 and accompanying text supra. This is reminiscent of
the "sliding scale" approach advocated by Justice Marshall, wherein the court
will vary the degree of scrutiny according to the importance of the affected
interest and the invidiousness of the discrimination. For a discussion of the
"sliding scale" approach, see note 22 supra.
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cumstances, the Supreme Court has not, at the present time, utilized
these factors in determining the standard of review in equal protection
challenges. 101 Furthermore, if the court was in fact reviewing the
challenged provision under a more stringent standard for the above
reasons, the court should not have done so sub silentio and without
an adequate explanation of its standard of review.102
The immediate impact of Delaware River Basin upon the litigants
will depend upon the disposition of the action on remand.103 Should
the ultimate result be against the constitutionality of Resolution 74-6
on equal protection grounds, 04 it is submitted that the Commission
would be required to redraft the Resolution to limit the exemption of
established users to their actual 1961 water usage.' 05 This would pre-
sumably result in increased costs to previously exempted users of Basin
water or their customers. 06 Furthermore, since the invalidation of the
Resolution would apparently provide a defense to the imposition of
water use charges previously imposed, other similarly situated users of
Basin water may bring actions to recover unconstitutionally exacted
charges.' 07
It is submitted that Delaware River Basin indicates that the Third
Circuit, in future cases involving equal protection claims, may not auto-
matically defer to legislative or administrative classifications.'0 8 Liti-
101. See note 97 supra. For a discussion of the factors determining the
standard of review for equal protection challenges, see notes 22-25 and accom-
panying text supra.
102. The Supreme Court has not always articulated the standards which it
has applied in the equal protection area. For instance, recent decisions which
were decided under the guise of the rational basis test are now viewed as
establishing an intermediate level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). For a discussion
of the intermediate level of scrutiny, see note 22 supra. This failure to ar-
ticulate the standard of review, or failure to adhere to an articulated standard
is confusing to the nation's lawmakers and to the general political community.
See Comment, supra note 21, at 559.
103. At the time of this writing, numerous parties have, in fact, inter-
vened in the lawsuit, apparently in response to the Third Circuit's suggestion.
The intervenors, who include other Basin water users, have entered the lawsuit
on both the side of the Authority and the Commission. There has been no
disposition of the case at this time.
104. See note 78 supra.
105. See 641 F.2d at 1100.
106. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra.
107. See 641 F.2d 1087. Other Basin water users have already intervened
on the side of the Authority, and presumably will also seek to recover water
charges already paid. The financial burden which would result from such
recovery is not clear from the court's discussion, although one may suspect it
would be substantial in light of the fact that charges imposed under the Reso-
lution were used to build two reservoirs. See note 8 supra.
108. See notes 86-89 and accompanying text supra.
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gants in cases involving grandfather provisions promulgated by admin-
istrative bodies, with a lack of articulated purpose or suggestions of
political favoritism, should be sensitive to the possibility of heightened
review of classifications affecting only economic interests.109  If the
Third Circuit continues to employ higher scrutiny of economic regula-
tions, it is probable that future litigation concerning other legislation
or administrative regulations will be encouraged. It is submitted, how-
ever, that future equal protection litigation should be governed by the
Supreme Court's interpretation and application of the rational basis
test, rather than the Third Circuit's application in Delaware River
Basin.110
Richard L. Umbrecht
109. See notes 96-100 and accompanying text supra. These factors may
have influenced the determination in the instant case on a cumulative basis;
thus it is not clear what effect the presence of one or more of these factors will
have in future litigation.
110. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STANDING-A PARTY WHO IS SUBJECT TO
POTENTIAL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER AN ALLEGEDLY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE HAS STANDING TO ASSERT
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES IN
DEFENDING AGAINST LIABILITY
UNDER THE STATUTE.
Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. (1981)
Sears, Roebuck and Company (Sears) sold a rifle and ammunition to
Lloyd Fullman, Jr.,' and failed to comply with a Delaware statute (sec-
tion 904) which required each purchaser of a deadly weapon to be
identified by two freeholders.2 The weapon and ammunition were used
by Fullman in an attempted robbery of a Wilmington restaurant where
James Hetherton worked as a guard.3 During the course of the robbery,
Fullman shot Hetherton in the head, severely wounding him. 4 Hether-
ton brought a negligence action against Sears in the United States
1. 652 F.2d 1152, 1154 (3d Cir. 1981). Fullman purchased both the rifle
and ammunition at a Sears, Roebuck department store in Wilmington, Delaware
on February 25, 1976. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 445 F. Supp. 294,
296 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 593 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. 1979), on remand,
493 F. Supp. 82 (D. Del. 1980).
2. 654 F.2d at 1154. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 904 (1974). Section
904 provided:
Any person desiring to engage in the business described in this
chapter shall keep and maintain in his place of business at all times a
book which shall be furnished him by the State Tax Department. In
such book he shall enter the date of the sale, the name and address of
the person purchasing any deadly weapon, the number and kind of
deadly weapon so purchased, the color of the person so purchasing the
same, the apparent age of the purchaser, and the names and addresses
of at least two freeholders resident in the county wherein the sale is
made, who shall positively identify the purchaser before the sale can
be made. No clerk, employee or other person associated with the
seller shall act as one of the identifying freeholders. The book shall
at all times be open for inspection by any judge, justice of the peace,
police officer, constable or other peace officer of this state.
Id. Although the statute does not define freeholder, Delaware case law defines
the term as one who is the owner of real property. 652 F.2d at 1154 n.1, citing
Gebelein v. Nashold, 406 A.2d 279 (Del. Ch. 1979). At the time Fullman pur-
chased the rifle and ammunition, he completed a Federal Firearms Transaction
Record, Form 4473, and produced a Delaware driver's license with his picture
on it; but failed to produce two Delaware freeholders for the purpose of
identifying him. 652 F.2d at 1154 n.2. Delaware subsequently amended § 904
to require identification by at least two residents of the state. Id. at 1159 n.7
9- 1154 n.2., citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 904 (Michie Supp. 1980).
3. 652 F.2d at 1154. Hetherton was a Wilmington Police Officer working
at an extra job as a guard. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck K Co., 445 F. Supp.
294, 296 (D. Del. 1978).
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District Court for the District of Delaware, seeking damages for the
injuries incurred in the shooting.5 The district court granted Sears'
motion for summary judgment,6 holding that there was no causal con-
nection between Sears' failure to obtain the requisite identification and
Hetherton's injuries.7 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
5. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 445 F. Supp. 294, 296 (D. Del. 1978).
The plaintiff's amended complaint stated three theories of liability: 1) Sears
violated § 904 of the Delaware Code in failing to require at least two freeholders
who were residents of New Castle County, Delaware, to positively identify
Fullman before selling him a deadly weapon; 2) Sears sold a deadly weapon to
a convicted felon without having reasonable cause to believe that the sale was
not in violation of state law, as required under the Gun Control Act of 1968,
18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(2) (1976); and 3) Sears was negligent because it failed to
exercise reasonable care in attempting to ascertain whether Fullman was pro-
hibited from possessing a deadly weapon under the Delaware Code. 445 F.
Supp. at 296.
For the text of the Delaware statute which requires identification by two
freeholders, see note 2 supra. Section 922 of the Gun Control Act provides in
pertinent part:
(b) It shall be unlawful for any licensed importer, licensed manu-
facturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector to sell or deliver-
(2) any firearm or ammunition to any person in any State where
the purchases or possession by such person of such firearm or ammuni-
tion would be in violation of any State law.
18 U.S.C. § 922 (1976). The Delaware statute regulating the purchase and
possession of deadly weapons by convicted felons and other classes of persons
provides in pertinent part:
Any person, having been convicted in this State . . . of a felony
... or any person who has ever been committed for a mental disorder
to any hospital, mental institution or sanatorium . . . or any person
who has been convicted for the unlawful use, possession or sale of a
narcotic, dangerous drug or central nervous system depressant or stimu-
lant drug . . . or of a narcotic drug or controlled substance . . . who
purchases, owns, possesses or controls any deadly weapon is guilty of a
class E felony.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1448 (1974).
6. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck ge Co., 445 F. Supp. 294, 305 (D. Del. 1978).
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant on all theories
of liability alleged by the plaintiffs. Id. at 305. As to the plaintiff's first theory,
even though Sears had violated § 904 of the Delaware Code, the court found
no causal connection between the statutory violation and the injuries sustained
by the plaintiff. Id. With regard to the second theory of liability, the court
concluded that compliance with specific Treasury Department regulations was
sufficient to constitute compliance with the federal Gun Control Act. Id. at
301. Since Sears complied with the procedures set out in the regulations by
obtaining identification and executing Form 4473 and was unaware of any
negative information concerning Fullman, the court found no violation of the
Gun Control Act. Id. at 299-301. As to the plaintiff's third theory of liability,
the court concluded that it would be "unwise to extend the common law to
recognize the possibility of a duty on the part of a firearms dealer to investigate
the truthfulness of a purchaser's statements, absent some knowledge or reason
to know that the purchaser is likely to misuse the firearm." Id. at 305.
7. Id. at 299. The court found that requiring the purchaser of a deadly
weapon to produce two freeholders only served to verify the identity of the
purchaser. Id. at 298. Because Fullman properly identified himself, the court
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for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of the
issues of proximate cause and damages.8 On remand, Sears defended on
the grounds that the Delaware statutory requirement of identification
by two freeholders violated the constitutional right to equal protection
of nonfreeholders who sought to participate in gun control procedures.9
Finding that Sears had met the third party standing requirements neces-
sary to challenge the constitutionality of the Delaware statute,' 0 the
district court concluded that the two freeholder requirement was
unconstitutional."
found that compliance with the statute would not have affected the sale. Id.
Thus, the court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate since there
were no factual issues or inferences in dispute and, as a matter of law, no show-
ing of proximate cause. Id. at 298-99.
8. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 593 F.2d 526, 530-32 (3d Cir. 1979).
The Third Circuit noted that requiring a purchaser to produce two freeholders
was a burdensome procedure which reduced the ease and simplicity of obtain-
ing a deadly weapon. Id. at 530. The court reasoned that it might have been
difficult, if not impossible, for someone like Fullman, who could not legally
purchase deadly weapons, to meet the additional identification requirement.
Id. at 530-31. In view of the fact that Fullman was not accompanied by two
freeholders, the court concluded that compliance with the statute would have
prevented consummation of the sale at least at that time. Id. at 531. The
court held that summary judgment was improperly granted since the issue of
proximate cause could not be determined as a matter of law. Id.
9. 652 F.2d at 1154. Sears raised this constitutional argument in its original
answer to Hetherton's complaint, but the district court, in deciding the summary
judgment motion, did not reach this argument. Id. On remand, Sears con-
tended that it had no duty to require Fullman to produce two freeholders
because the Delaware statutory provision was unconstitutional. Hetherton v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 493 F. Supp. 82, 85 (D. Del. 1980). Specifically, Sears
contended that the statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment because it discriminated against Delaware citizens capable of par-
ticipating in the regulatory functions of § 904 on the basis of wealth or property
holding status. Id. In addition, Sears asserted the interests of potential vendees
who knew no freeholders in purchasing deadly weapons. Id.
10. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 493 F. Supp. 82, 86 (D. Del. 1980).
The district court concluded that under the statute, Sears had a legal duty to
require anyone purchasing a firearm to produce two freeholders who could
identify the purchaser. Id. at 86. Since the failure to perform this duty ex-
posed Sears to significant civil liability and could lead to criminal prosecution,
the court found that the statute clearly caused Sears injury in fact and that
Sears had a "weighty personal interest" in demonstrating that the law was un-
constitutional. Id.
11. Id. at 87. The court found the requirement of § 904 to be "constitu-
tionally infirm because it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. For the text of § 904, see note 2 supra. The fourteenth
amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The court found it unnecessary to decide whether it should review the
statute's property-based classification under strict scrutiny, the minimum ration-
ality standard, or some intermediate test, since it concluded that the freeholder
identification requirement of § 904 was not rationally related to any conceivable
legitimate state interest and, therefore, could not meet even the least demand-
ing standard of review. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck 8c Co., 493 F. Supp. 82, 88
(D. Del. 1980). The court also concluded that, in light of the finding of un-
constitutionality, Sears could not be held to a duty under the statute to require
[VOL. 27: p. 636
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On a second appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit 12 affirmed,'3 holding that the existence of potential civil
and criminal liability gave Sears standing to challenge the constitutional-
ity of section 904 and that section 904 was unconstitutional under the
fourteenth amendment. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 652 F.2d
1152 (3d Cir. 1981).
The concept of standing to sue derives from article III of the
Constitution, which extends the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
certain "cases or controversies." 14 In the 1975 case of Warth v. Seldin,15
the identification of two freeholders in addition to the positive identification
provided by the driver's license. Id. at 89.
12. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Higginbotham and Weis, and
Judge Barron P. McCune of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. Judge Higginbotham delivered
the opinion of the court. Judge Weis dissented.
13. 652 F.2d at 1155. The court reasoned that the requirement that the
identification be performed exclusively by freeholders did not bear any rational
relationship to the achievement of the statute's objectives and therefore violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. I. Section 2, clause 1 provides in pertinent
part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-
between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
Also derived from article III is the concept of mootness, which involves
the extinction of a litigant's personal stake in the outcome of the case due to
changes in law or in fact that occur after the initiation of a lawsuit. See North
Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 n.7 (1969). See generally, G. GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1653-55 (10th ed. 1980); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REv. 373 (1974). Although the Court has in-
sisted that the mootness doctrine is an aspect of the article III case and contro-
versy requirement, the modern Court has frequently relaxed the mootness bar-
rier. See Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974). In Defunis, the Court
found that mootness barred an equal protection challenge to a law school
minority admissions policy. Id. at 319-20. The petitioner, DeFunis, gained
admission to the school while the case was in the courts. Id. at 314-15. By the
time the case reached the Supreme Court, DeFunis was in his last semester of
law school. Id. at 316. The Court found that the issue was not "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" and held the claim nonjusticiable. Id. at 319.
The Court reasoned that if the admissions procedures of the law school re-
mained in force, there was "no reason to suppose that a subsequent case attack-
ing those procedures [would] not come with relative speed to this Court." Id.
See also United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Geraghty, the Court held that an action
brought on behalf of a class does not become moot upon expiration of the
named plaintiff's substantive claim. 445 U.S. at 404. Since the class certification
had been denied, the proposed representative of the class retained a "personal
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss3/8
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the Supreme Court defined the contours of the doctrine of standing,
which remain substantially intact today. The Court in Warth stated
that in order to have standing to sue a party "must allege specific, con-
crete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and
that he would personally benefit in a tangible way from the court's
intervention." 16
stake" in obtaining class certification sufficient to assure that article III was not
undermined. Id. Although the mootness doctrine requires that an actual
controversy must exist at all stages of review, the Roe Court did not find that
mootness barred the adjudication of the petitioner's constitutional challenge to
criminal abortion statutes even though the petitioner was no longer pregnant.
410 U.S. at 124. Justice Blackmun explained the Court's decision:
[W]hen, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation,
the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the preg-
nancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete.
If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will
survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be ef-
fectively denied . . . . Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a
conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be "capable of repetition,
yet evading review."
Id. at 125, citing Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
A related exception to the mootness doctrine is the principle of "a
continuing harm to the plaintiff." See G. GUNTHER, supra, at 1653. A
common example of this exception is the reluctance of the Court to find various
challenges to criminal convictions moot even though the defendants have com-
pleted serving their sentence. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244
(1971) (relying on "collateral consequences" to the conviction such as barriers to
voting and to holding public office); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
(overcoming the mootness question on the "mere 'possibility'" of collateral
consequences stemming from a criminal conviction).
For a sampling of the Supreme Court's interpretations of the case or con-
troversy requirement, see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968).
15. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). In Warth, several organizations and individuals
brought an action against the town of Penfield, New York. Id. at 493. The
petitioners claimed that the town's zoning ordinance excluded low and moderate
income groups from living in Penfield in violation of their first, ninth, and
fourteenth amendment rights. Id. The Court found that four distinct groups
of plaintiffs failed to establish standing to sue. Id. at 502-18. The low and
moderate income minority plaintiffs lacked standing because they had failed to
allege that the zoning ordinance resulted in the denial of permits to builders
and that without the ordinance, housing would have been available to them.
Id. at 502-08. The Rochester taxpayers were denied standing on the basis of
the prudential bar to the assertion of a third party's constitutional rights. Id.
at 509-10. The housing associations lacked standing because they had failed to
show that their groups had been economically injured or that a member of the
groups had been injured. Id. at 511-14. And finally, the developer/builders
were denied standing because they had not alleged that any one of their mem-
bers had been denied a permit to build. Id. at 514-16.
16. Id. at 508 (footnote omitted). The Court stated that "[a]bsent the
necessary allegations of demonstrable, particularized injury, there can be no
confidence of 'a real need to exercise the power of judicial review' ....... Id.
at 508, quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22
(1974).
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The constitutionally compelled standard for standing to sue of
injury in fact and a causal connection between the injury and the chal-
lenged action was further refined by the Court the following year in
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization 17 where the
Court rejected a challenge by several indigents to a tax regulation
which affected nonprofit hospitals.18 A majority of the Court concluded
that the plaintiffs' allegations failed to establish standing to sue since
there was no showing of an injury to the plaintiffs "likely to be re-
dressed by a favorable decision." 19 In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
In addition to the injury in fact standard, the Warth Court set forth the
requirement of a causal relationship between the defendant's actions and the
plaintiff's injury. 422 U.S. at 504. The Court indicated that this additional
requirement-a showing that the requested relief would redress the plaintiff's
injury-was an article III limitation. Id. at 505. The Court reasoned that
absent the two-pronged test of injury in fact and a sufficient causal connection,
courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of major public sig-
nificance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent
to address such questions and even though judicial intervention may be un-
necessary to protect individual rights. Id. at 499-500, citing Schlesinger v.
Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974). For a discussion of Warth
and its ramifications, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUnONAL LAW 92-97 (1978);
Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 H~Auv. L. REV. 1373 (1978).
17. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
18. Id. at 45. In Simon, several indigents and their representative organi-
zations challenged an Internal Revenue Service Ruling which reduced the
amount of indigent services required to be provided by a hospital in order for
the hospital to receive status as a "charitable institution." Id. at 30. Specifi-
cally, the Ruling granted favorable tax treatment to any hospital which pro-
vided indigents emergency room service, without the need for the hospital to
provide a full range of services. Id. at 28. The plaintiffs alleged that the new
Ruling encouraged hospitals to deny services to indigents. Id. at 33.
19. Id. at 38. The Court held that the respondents failed to carry their
burden when they did not assert that the injury was a consequence of the de-
fendant's actions or that the requested relief would remove the harm. Id.,
citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Even though each indigent de-
scribed a specific occasion when he or a member of his family had been denied
hospital services due to indigency, the Court found that the plaintiffs lacked
standing. 426 U.S. at 41. justice Powell, writing for the majority, viewed
article III as requiring a federal court to redress only "injury that fairly can be
traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results
from the independent action of some third party not before the court." Id. at
41-42. justice Powell reasoned that it did not follow from the plaintiff's allega-
tion that the denial of access to hospital services resulted from the Revenue
Ruling or that a court-ordered return by the Internal Revenue Service to the
previous policy would insure that the plaintiffs would receive the hospital
service they desired. Id. at 42. The Court stated:
It is purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the
complaint fairly can be traced to [IRS] "encouragement" or instead re-
sult from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax
implications. It is equally speculative whether the desired exercise of
the court's remedial powers in this suit would result in the availability
to [plaintiffs] of such services. So far as the complaint sheds light, it is
just as plausible that the hospitals to which [plaintiffs] may apply for
service would elect to forego favorable tax treatment to avoid the un-
1981-82]
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Environmental Study Group,20 the Court applied perhaps its most
generous view, from a plaintiff's standpoint, of the two-pronged consti-
tutional test 21 and found standing to sue despite a relatively tenuous
causal connection between the alleged illegal action and the plaintiff's
injury.22
. Although a party may have the requisite personal stake in the out-
come of the litigation to satisfy the requirements of article II, there may
be "prudential" considerations which will nonetheless prevent a court
determined financial drain of an increase in the level of uncompensated
services.
Id. at 42-43.
20. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). In Duke, forty individuals who lived near the sites
for proposed nuclear power plants, an environmental group, and a labor organi-
zation claimed that the Price-Anderson Act violated due process by limiting
aggregate liability for a single nuclear accident to $560 million. Id. at 72.
21. See L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 9-13.
22. See 438 U.S. at 72-81. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger
noted that the personal stake requirement of article III had "come to mean not
only a 'distinct and palpable injury' to the plaintiff but also a 'fairly traceable'
causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct."
Id. at 72, quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977). With respect to the plaintiffs' injury, the Court found that
several immediate adverse effects harmed the plaintiffs including the threatened
reduction in property values and the increase in the temperature of a lake used
for recreational purposes. 438 U.S. at 72-73. With respect to the more difficult
causal issue, the Court, relying on the findings of the district court, found "a
substantial likelihood that Duke would not be able to complete the construction
and maintain the operation of [the nuclear] plants but for the protection pro-
vided by the Price-Anderson Act." Id. at 74-75, citing Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 431 F. Supp. 203, 219 (W.D.N.C. 1977). Based
upon this analysis of the Article III requirements, the Court concluded that the
plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Act. 438 U.S. at 81. For a discussion
of the ramifications of Duke Power, see Varat, Variable Justiciability and the
Duke Power Case, 58 TEx. L. REv. 273 (1980).
In its most recent exposition of the article III requirement of injury in
fact, the Court denied standing to a nonprofit organization which sought to
challenge the conveyance of federal property to a religious educational institu-
tion as a violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment. See
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 4103 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982), reversing 619 F.2d 252
(3d Cir. 1980). The Court stated that article III standing requirements include
two elements: 1) the party seeking judicial resolution must "show that he per-
sonally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant;" and 2) the injury "fairly can be traced to the
challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Id.
at 4105, citing Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979);
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976). Although
the respondents were committed to the principle of separation of church and
state, the Court held that they had failed to allege any personal injury sufficient
to confer standing and that the invocation of the establishment clause did notjustify any exception to the standing requirements of article III. 50 U.S.L.W.
at 4108-10. The Court thus reversed the Third Circuit's ruling that respondents
had established injury in fact through "'their shared individual right to a
government that shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion.'"
Id. at 4108, quoting Americans United for Separation of Church and State v.
Valley Forge Christian College, 619 F.2d at 261. For a discussion of the Third
Circuit's attempt to expand the permissible bounds of standing, see Note,
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from reaching the merits of the controversy. 23 One such consideration has
taken shape as the rule that a party does not have standing to vindicate
the constitutional rights of another.24 The underlying rationale for this
rule, as frequently stated by the Court, is to avoid unnecessary consti-
tutional adjudication.2 5 However, the Court has recognized exceptions
to this rule 26 and will allow third party, or "jus tertii", standing when the
following factors exist: 27 1) the presence of some substantial relationshi4
between the claimant and the third party; 28 2) the impossibility of the
Citizen Interest in the Establishment Clause Held Sufficient to Challenge An
Alleged Violation of That Clause, 26 VILL. L. REV. 609 (1981).
23. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 120-23, 143, 146-54 (1962);
L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 52-80; Benzanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court
and Allocation of Judicial Power, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1107; Scharpf, Judicial
Review and the Political Question Doctrine: A Functional Analysts, 75 YALE
L.J. 517 (1966). Cf. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of
the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974).
24. See Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV.
423 (1974). The Supreme Court has stated that this prudential standing rule
"normally bars litigants from asserting the rights or legal interests of others in
order to obtain relief from injury to themselves." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
at 509. The Warth Court applied this rule to one of the groups of plaintiffs
who had challenged certain zoning practices and found that none of the excep-
tions to the rule was present. Id. For a discussion of Warth, see notes 15-16
and accompanying text supra. In an earlier formulation of the third party
standing rule, the Court stated that it "ordinarily precludes a person from
challenging the constitutionality of state action by invoking the rights of others."
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). The Court has articulated the
policy concerns which support the rule as "the avoidance of adjudication of
rights which those not before the Court may not wish to assert, and the assur-
ance that the most effective advocate of the rights at issue is present to champion
them." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. at 80.
See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO &c H. WECHSLER, HART &
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 184-91 (2d ed.
1973).
25. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14, 116 (1976); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459
(1958); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). Justice Brandeis, in a
frequently cited passage, set forth the various instances in which the Court will
refrain from deciding constitutional questions even though the cases may be
within the Court's jurisdiction. See Ashwander v. TVA, 296 U.S. 288, 345-48
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). For a comment on the rules set forth in
Ashwander, see Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment
on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
26. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 123 (1976). For a discussion
of Singleton, see notes 39-41 and accompanying text infra. See generally G.
GUNTHER, supra note 14, at 1631-53; L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 79-114 (1978);
Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Teitii in the Supreme Court, 71
YALE L.J. 599 (1962); Note, supra note 24, at 423. See Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. at 500-01. The Court stated: "In some circumstances, countervailing con-
siderations may outweigh the concerns underlying the usual reluctance to exert
judicial power when the plaintiff's claim to relief rests on the legal rights of
third parties." Id.
27. See notes 28-47 and accompanying text infra.
28. Note, supra note 24, at 425, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
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rightholder's assertion of his own constitutional rights; 29 and 3) the
need to avoid a dilution of third party constitutional rights that would
result if the assertion of those rights was not permitted.3 o These factors
are illustrated by several Supreme Court cases in which a litigant's
standing to assert the constitutional rights of a third party was recog-
nized. 81 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,32 a parochial school was per-
mitted to assert the liberty interests of parents in its challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute requiring parents to send their children to
public schools.3 3 Similarly, in NAACP v. Alabama,3 4 the NAACP was
permitted to assert the first amendment and privacy rights of its mem-
bers in resisting a state order to disclose its membership lists.3 5  In
Griswold v. Connecticut,36 the director of a Planned Parenthood Clinic
and a licensed physician, who were convicted as accessories to the viola-
29. Note, supra note 24, at 425, citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
459 (1958). For a discussion of NAACP, see notes 34 & 35 and accompanying
text infra.
30. Note, supra note 24, at 425, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 481 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953). The commentator
states that the Barrows Court "appeared to be motivated by both the difficulty
of the rightholders' assertion of their rights, and the likelihood that forbidding
the assertion of jus tertii and enforcing the covenant would deny blacks the
equal protection of the laws." Note, supra note 24, at 426.
31. See notes 32-37 and accompanying text infra.
32. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
33. Id. at 518. Although the Pierce Court failed to list specific criteria for
the recognition of standing, its holding was based upon the close relationship
between the parents and the school, the desire to protect business enterprises
from interference with the freedom of their patrons, and the importance of the
parents' constitutional right-the liberty interest in child rearing and education.
Id.
34. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In NAACP v. Alabama, the state had obtained a
court order requiring the Association to produce membership lists. Id. at 453.
Upon its refusal to comply with the court order, the NAACP was held in con-
tempt. Id. at 451. The NAACP brought an action against the state, seeking
review of the contempt judgment. Id. at 450.
35. Id. at 459. The Court noted that because litigation by individual
members would require disclosure of their identity, and thus, destroy the free-
dom of association threatened by the court order, the NAACP was the appro-
priate party to vindicate that right. Id. The Court stated that the Association
"argues more appropriately the rights of its members, and that its nexus with
them is sufficient to permit that it act as their representative .. . . Id. at 458.
The Court remarked that the constitutional rights of third parties could not be
effectively guarded except by those before the Court. Id. at 459, citing Barrows
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-59 (1953); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGarth 341 U.S. 123, 183-87 (1951). The NAACP Court mentioned two
factors which justified the assertion of third party rights in this case: I) the
rights of the parties were intertwined; and 2) the likelihood that the Association
itself would be adversely affected by a decrease in membership and diminished
financial support. Id.
36. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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tion of a contraceptives use statute, were permitted to raise the privacy
interests of married persons using contraceptives.37
The Burger Court has adhered to this view of standing to assert
third party rights.8 8 In Singleton v. Wulff,3 9 the Court held that two
physicians had standing to assert the privacy rights of their patients in
challenging a statute which denied medicaid payments for abortions that
were not medically necessary.40 In a plurality opinion, the Court held
that third party rights could be asserted when: 1) the plaintiff has a close
relationship to the third party whose rights are sought to be asserted;
and 2) the third party faces "some genuine obstacle" to asserting his or
her own rights.41 The Court reached a similar result in Craig v. Boren,42
when it permitted vendors to assert the rights of their customers. 43 In
Craig, a licensed vendor challenged an Oklahoma statute which pro-
hibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-one and
37. Id. The Court, in reiterating its desire to avoid unnecessary constitu-
tional adjudication, stated that any doubts regarding standing are "removed by
reason of a criminal conviction for serving married couples in violation of an
aiding-and-abetting statute." Id. at 481. The Court reasoned that an accessory
should have standing to assert that the offense with which he is charged cannot
constitutionally be a crime. Id.
38. See GUNTHER, supra note 14, at 1650; Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of
Others: The Troubled Law of Third-Party Standing and Mootness in the
Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMi L. REV. 393 (1981).
39. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
40. Id. at 118. The Court found that the statute unconstitutionally inter-
fered with the decision to terminate pregnancy. Id. at 108.
41.. Id. at 114-16. With respect to the first proposition, the Court reasoned
that "[i]f the enjoyment of the right is inextricably bound up with the activity
the litigant wishes to pursue," the Court can be sure that adjudication of the
right is "not unnecessary in the sense that the right's enjoyment will be un-
affected by the outcome of the suit." Id. at 115. With respect to the second
proposition, the Court stated that if there is some genuine obstacle to the as-
sertion of the right by the third party, that party's "absence from court loses its
tendency to suggest that his right is not truly at stake, or truly important to
him, and the party who is in court becomes by the default the right's best avail-
able proponent." Id. at 116, citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953). In applying these two principles to the facts before it, the Court em-
phasized: 1) the closeness of the doctor-patient relationshi in both the situa-
tion where a patient could not secure an abortion without the aid of a physician,
and the situation where a poor patient could not obtain an abortion unless the
State paid the physician; and 2) the obstacles to the patient's assertion of her
own rights, including the desire to protect the privacy of her decision to abort
as well as the problem of mootness. 428 U.S. at 116-17.
Although the Court noted that constitutional rights should not be adjudi-
cated unnecessarily because the holders of those rights "either do not wish to
assert them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court
litigant is successful .... " the Court concluded that this policy limitation
should be overcome. Id. at 113-14, 116, citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S.
288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (noting that the standing require-
ment is used to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication).
42. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
43. Id. at 197.
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to females under the age of eighteen. 44 The question before the Court
was whether this gender-based distinction denied equal protection to
males eighteen to twenty years of age.45 The Court determined that
the vendor had standing, finding that the Oklahoma statute plainly
inflicted injury in fact upon the vendor 4 6 and that the third party
rights would be "diluted or adversely affected" if the Court declined to
hear the constitutional challenge.
47
Against this background, the Third Circuit addressed the issues of
whether Sears had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
Delaware statute 48 and, if so, whether the statute violated the equal
44. Id. at 191-92.
45. Id. at 192. Before reaching the equal protection issue, the Court dis-
cussed the vendor's standing to challenge the statute through the assertion of
the fourteenth amendment rights of 18 to 20 year old males. Id. at 192-97.
46. Id. at 194. The Court noted that the legal duties created by the statu-
tory scheme obliged the vendor either to obey the statute, thereby incurring a
direct economic injury through the constriction of the vendor's market, or to
disobey the statutory requirement and risk sanctions and a possible loss of
license. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that the vendor's injury in fact was
sufficient to guarantee "concrete adverseness." Id.
47. Id. at 195, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
The Court reasoned that the threatened imposition of governmental sanctions
might deter the appellant and other vendors from selling 3.2% beer to young
men, and thus the "enforcement of the challenged restriction against the
[vendor] would result indirectly in the violation of third parties' rights." 429
U.S. at 195, citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 510 (1975).
Although the Court has articulated at least three factors which justify the
assertion of third party standing, there has been no uniform application of these
factors, in that standing has been recognized when one or more of these factors
are present in various factual contexts. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); ROHR, supra note 38, at 404-26. As a
result, many of the lower federal courts have adopted a liberal stance with re-
gard to the assertion of third party standing. See ROHR, supra note 38, at 433-
34. For example, some courts have granted standing solely on the basis of the
"relationship" factor that was stated in Singleton. Id. at 434 (footnotes omitted).
Other courts have permitted standing solely on the basis of a "genuine obstacle"
to the third party's assertion of his own rights. Id. One court which strictly
followed Singleton required the presence of both factors. Id. A few courts have
only required an impact upon third party rights, with no pre-existing or estab-
lished relationship. Id. In addition, other courts have recognized standing
when adjudication did not contravene the policies underlying the general rule
barring third party standing. Id. at 435 (footnotes omitted).The Third Circuit has also adopted a generous view of the exceptions to
the rule barring the assertion of third party rights. See United States v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980). In Westinghouse, the United
States had moved for an order under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
directing the employer to produce certain documents. Id. at 572. The em-
ployer refused, relying on the privacy interests of its employees. Id. at 570, 574.
The court recognized the employer's standing to challenge the subpoena by
asserting the privacy interests of its employees since the employer was subject to
the. penalty of a contempt sanction. Id. at 574. The Court summarily con-
cluded that prudential bars to standing were absent and recognized standing
primarily on a finding of injury in fact. Id.
48. 652 F.2d at 1155-57.
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protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.49 As to the standing
issue, the court initially noted that the jurisdiction of federal courts is
limited by article III of the United States Constitution to "cases" or
"controversies." 5o The court then indicated that recent Supreme Court
decisions 5  direct the courts to determine whether the parties have
suffered injury in fact to an interest arguably within the zone of interests
protected or regulated by the statute in question.52
Finding that Sears had clearly suffered the requisite injury through
its exposure to potential liability,5 3 the court addressed the dissent's
view that Sears should be denied standing due to the "prudential" con-
cern against allowing the assertion of the constitutional rights of a third
party not before the court.54 In analyzing this issue, the court relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in Craig v. Boren,55 and its own decision
in United States v. Westinghouse,5 a jus tertii case.57 The court noted
that the principle factor present in both Craig and Westinghouse was
49. Id. at 1157-59.
50. Id. at 1155. For the relevant text of article III, see note 14 supra.
The Hetherton court emphasized the Supreme Court's decisions which focused
on whether the aggrieved party has such a personal stake in the outcome of the
litigation as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the issues pre-
sented to the court. Id., citing Flast v. Cohen, 393 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). For a discussion of the article III requirement
of injury in fact see notes 14-24 and accompanying text supra.
51. 652 F.2d at 1155, citing Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 163 (1970).
52. 652 F.2d at 1155.
53. Id. at 1155-56. The court examined the district court's findings that
under § 904 of the Delaware statute, Sears had a legal duty to require anyone
purchasing a firearm from Sears to produce two freeholders for identification
and that the failure to perform this duty was exposing Sears to " 'a very large
potential liability and could lead to criminal prosecution.'" Id., quoting Heth-
erton v. Sears, Roebuck 8c Co., 493 F. Supp. 82, 86 (D. Del. 1980).
54. 652 F.2d at 1156-57. The court noted that Sears sought to assert the
interests of nonfreeholders to participate in the enforcement of § 904 and the
rights of persons who want to purchase deadly weapons but do not know any
freeholders. Id. at 1156 (footnote omitted). See note 9 and accompanying text
supra. The court distinguished Supreme Court cases involving prudential
limitations on standing as presenting "situations totally separate from the present
case." Id. at 1156, citing Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 220-23 (1973); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968). The court noted
that parties may lack standing because the alleged injury is too abstract or
general in nature, as in Schlesinger, or because the case calls for the resolution
of a political question, as in Flast. 652 F.2d at 1156. While acknowledging
that Sears' challenge to the statute would not benefit any Delaware citizens in
the future because that statute had already been amended, the court neverthe-
less found that the case was not moot. Id. The court reasoned that Sears'
liability stemmed from events on the day of the sale and that, therefore, Sears
"should have the same right on the basis of jus tertii to challenge § 904 as it
would have had had there been no amendment." Id. at 1156-57.
55. 652 F.2d at 1156-57, citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
56. 652 F.2d at 1156-57, citing United States v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570
(3d Cir. 1980).
57. For a discussion of Westinghouse, see note 47 supra.
1981-82]
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss3/8
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
that the party seeking to assert the rights of a third party was subject to
sanctions for the failure to obey either an unconstitutional statute or an
impermissible subpoena. 58 The court found the policies underlying
both cases apposite to Hetherton.59 The Hetherton court determined
that Sears was "in the best position to cogently present the constitutional
arguments" 60 and that "any prudential considerations [were] outweighed
by Sears' vital and immediate interests in challenging § 904." 61 After
concluding that Sears was a proper party to champion the issue, the
Hetherton court held that the Delaware statute was not rationally related
to any legitimate state interest.62
In dissent, Judge Weis focused primarily on the question of whether
Sears should be allowed to assert the constitutional rights of third
parties. 6 3 Judge Weis agreed with the majority that Sears had suffered
actual injury from the operation of the statute, 64 and thus, had satisfied
the standing requirements of article 111.65 However, he maintained that
prudential considerations should prevent a determination that Sears
had standing.6 6 After setting forth the factors which have led the
58. 652 F.2d at 1157.
59. Id. The court found that when the party seeking to assert third party
rights is subject to sanctions, the policy consideration that the best advocate of
the constitutional arguments should be before the court is satisfied. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1156.
62. Id. at 1157-59. Recognizing that a leaseholder is capable of feeling the
same "attachment to the community" as a freeholder, the court concluded that
"[flor Delaware to assume that only citizens with the wealth and/or interest in
owning real property are capable of participating in the regulatory functions of§ 904 is simply not rational." Id. at 1158. The court also rejected the argument
that the freeholder requirement is rationally related to a state objective of mak-
ing the purchase of a deadly weapon more burdensome. Id. at 1159. Judge
Higginbotham stated that
[t]he state may have an interest in restricting the sale of firearms; how-
ever, it cannot do so by creating irrational and unconstitutional classi-
fications. . . . If Delaware desired to burden the sale of firearms by
restricting them to persons who are non-felons or otherwise stable mem-
bers of the community, it should have done so by a more narrowly
tailored statute.
Id.
63. Id. at 1160-65 (Weis, J., dissenting). Finding no standing on the part
of the defendants to raise the constitutional rights of nonfreeholders, the dissent
did not reach the equal protection issue. Id. at 1165 (Weis, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1160 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis noted that Sears was ex-
posed to potential civil and criminal liability, and thus, actual injury had been
shown. Id.
65. Id. Judge Weis relied on the Supreme Court's statement that a litigant
who "asserts the rights of third parties defensively, as a bar to judgment against
him" has satisfied article III standing requirements. Id., quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. at 55 n.12. For a discussion of constitutional standing require-
ments, see notes 14-24 and accompanying text supra.
66. 652 F.2d at 1161-62 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis noted that the
rule against the assertion of third party rights was a "self-imposed, nonconstitu-
tional limitation, founded on prudential considerations," and that the rule has
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Supreme Court to relax the rule against the assertion of jus tertii,67
Judge Weis examined the facts of the Hetherton case to determine
whether any of these factors was present. 8 First, Judge Weis noted
that nonfreeholders were capable of asserting their own rights. 69
Second, Sears' interest and that of the class whose rights it purported to
assert were not the same. 70 Finally, Judge Weis found that substantial
been invoked to avoid unwarranted intervention in cases involving nebulous
and speculative constitutional issues. Id. at 1161 (Weis, J., dissenting), citing
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 193. In addition, Judge Weis noted that the
Supreme Court has favored the avoidance of adjudication of rights that third
parties may not wish to assert and the postponement of judicial resolution until
the most effective advocate of the right is before the court. 652 F.2d at 1161
(Weis, J., dissenting), citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. at 80.
67. 652 F.2d at 1161-62 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis listed the fol-
lowing criteria:
1) the existence of countervailing considerations, such as the impos-
sibility or difficulty attending third parties' efforts to assert their rights;
2) the lack of justification for enforcing the rule, as is true when there
is such a congruence of interest between the third parties' rights and
those of the proponent that they are tightly interwoven; and 3) the
need to vindicate broad constitutional policy, for example, when funda-
mental rights are at stake.
Id. at 1161 (Weis, J., dissenting). In addition, Judge Weis noted that the Court
has also permitted third party standing when denial of standing would have
"diluted or adversely affected third-party rights." Id. But, as Judge Weis
reasoned, there was no possibility that third party rights would be diluted in
Hetherton because the challenged portion of the statute had already been
amended. Id.
Although the majority addressed both the rights of nonfreeholders to par-
ticipate in the regulatory procedures of § 904 and the rights of potential vendees
who did not know two freeholders, the dissent limited its discussion to the
participatory rights of nonfreeholders because the district court had so limited
its decision. Id.
68. Id. at 1162-65 (Weis, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1163 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis noted that nothing
would have prevented nonfreeholders, "had they been so inclined," from chal-
lenging the validity of the statute. Id. Since the remedy of declaratory judg-
ment and a forum were available, Judge Weis concluded that the third party's
absence from court when there was no genuine obstacle to that party's ability
to bring an action tended to suggest that the third party's right was not truly at
stake or important to him. Id., citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. at 116.
70. 652 F.2d at 1164 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis reasoned that Sears
sold the rifle and ammunition without any identification of the purchaser, and
that the nonfreeholders' interest in gun control was thereby irrelevant. Id.
Thus, as far as the particular sale to Fullman was concerned, judge Weis found
that Sears' economic interests would not have been furthered by the availability
of two nonfreeholders to vouch for Fullman. Id. In addition, Judge Weis
noted that the absence of a freeholder requirement in the future might increase
Sears' sales of weapons. Id. Unlike Craig, where the third parties sought access
to the market, the third parties in Hetherton did not seek access to the market
but desired to prevent gun sales. Id. Therefore, Judge Weis concluded that
no community of interest existed between Sears and the third parties whose
rights it sought to assert. Id.
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constitutional issues were not raised.71 Consequently, Judge Weis con-
cluded that there was no persuasive reason to justify dispensing with the
rule against third party standing. 72
It is submitted that the Hetherton court improperly recognized
Sears' standing to raise the interests of third parties. In examining the
jus tertii issue, Judge Higginbotham failed to properly deal with rel-
evant Supreme Court precedent.78 The Supreme Court has delineated
three specific factors which may justify the assertion of third party
rights.7 4 The Hetherton court's failure to undertake an analysis of these
factors not only pretermits Supreme Court precedent 75 but seriously
undermines the significant policy considerations which support the
general rule against third party standing.76
As the dissent correctly noted, none of the factors enunciated by
the Supreme Court was present in Hetherton.7 7  The Hetherton
majority, relying on Craig and Westinghouse, implicitly determined that
71. Id. Judge Weis noted that standing is generally granted when the
constitutional question implicates a fundamental right. Id., citing Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (standing granted to vendor when
customer's privacy rights were asserted); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953)
(recognizing standing when the issue involved allegations of racial discrimination
in property ownership); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (permit-
ting the proprietor of a private school to litigate the interest of parents in child
rearing and education). Judge Weis stated that the constitutional issue raised in
Hetherton, the rights of citizens to participate in the enforcement procedures of
§ 904, was of little import. 652 F.2d at 1164 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis
distinguished this right to participate in the field of law enforcement from the
more fundamental matters of "freedom from discrimination in voting, owning
property, or availing oneself of first amendment rights of association, privacy,
the exercise of religion, and rearing children," which do offer persuasive reasons
for abandoning the prohibition against jus tertii. Id. at 1165 (Weis, J., dissent-
ing).
72. 652 F.2d at 1165 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis found that in the
absence of any of the three elements which would justify an exception to the
general rule restricting third party standing, the court should exercise self-
restraint even though article III standing was clearly established. Id. at 1162-65
(Weis, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 1156-57; note 54 and accompanying text supra. For a dis-
cussion of Supreme Court authority dealing directly with third party standing,
see notes 31-47 and accompanying text supra. The court distinguished Hether-
ton on the basis of two Supreme Court decisions which only peripherally ad-
dressed third party standing. See 652 F.2d at 1156, citing Schlesinger v.
Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1973) (dealing primarily with the
political question doctrine) Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (dealing
primarily with taxpayer standing). See also note 85 and accompanying text
infra. Although the Hetherton court did rely predominantly on one Supreme
Court case which specifically analyzed the requirements for jus tertii-Craig v.
Boren-this case is distinguishable from Hetherton. See notes 78-80 & 90 and
accompanying text infra.
74. For a discussion of these criteria, see notes 28-30 and accompanying
text supra.
75. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
76. For a discussion of these policy considerations, see notes 25, 35 8 37
supra.
77. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text supra.
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the relationship of vendor-vendee was sufficient to recognize third party
standing7s However, unlike Craig, where the third parties sought access
to the market, the third parties in Hetherton desired to prevent gun
sales7 9 Thus, Sears lacked a congruence of interest with the parties
whose rights Sears asserted.8 0 Furthermore, Hetherton did not involve
the assertion of fundamental constitutional interests. 81 The right to
participate in the enforcement of gun control regulation is not among
those fundamental rights which the Supreme Court has recognized in
granting third party standing, such as the rights of parents to direct the
education of their children s 2 the right to marital privacy 83 and the
right to be free from racial discrimination.s4 Apparently Judge Higgin-
botham glossed over this type of an analysis 85 and based his decision
predominantly on the article III consideration of injury in fact without
adequately explaining why the prudential considerations articulated
by the Supreme Court were outweighed in this case.86
Moreover, as the Supreme Court has consistently stated, these
prudential considerations in questions of jus tertii standing are based
on a desire to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication.8 7 It is
suggested that this policy concern further buttresses the conclusion that
Sears did not have standing to raise the equal protection issue. First,
as Justice Blackmun stated in Singleton v. Wulff, constitutional ad-
judication is unnecessary when "the right's enjoyment will be unaffected
by the outcome of the suit." 88 This rationale is especially applicable to
Hetherton in view of the redraft of the Delaware statute which
allowed nonfreeholders to participate in the enforcement provisions.8 9
78. See 652 F.2d at 1156-57; notes 55-58 and accompanying text supra. For
a discussion of Craig, see notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra. For a dis-
cussion of Westinghouse, see note 47 supra.
79. 652 F.2d at 1154 (Weis, J., dissenting). See also note 70 supra.
80. 652 F.2d at 1154 (Weis, J., dissenting).
81. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
82. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). For a discussion of
Pierce, see notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text supra.
83. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a discussion of Gris-
wold, see notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text supra.
84. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
85. S-e 652 F.2d at 1156. The court reiterated the general rule that courts
will not permit a party to assert the rights of others when those third parties
are capable of representing their own interests. Id. The court then set forth
the third party rights Sears sought to assert and concluded that any prudential
considerations were outweighed by Sears' "vital and immediate" interest in chal-
lenging § 904. Id.
86. See note 73 supra.
87. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249 (1953).
88. 428 U.S. at 115. For a discussion of Singleton, see notes 39-41 and ac-
companying text supra.
89. 652 F.2d at 1159 n.7. See note 2 supra.
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It is submitted that the concern in Craig, that the vendor would be re-
quired to continue the discrimination or risk some type of sanction, did
not apply in Hetherton because the discriminatory aspects of the statute
had been eliminated. 90 The second, related ground is that the revision
of the statute rendered the equal protection issue moot,9' and therefore,
the court should not have considered the matter.
It is further suggested that the Hetherton court not only failed to
apply valid Supreme Court precedent, but did so without clearly
articulating a test to apply in future jus tertii cases. The court's justi-
fication for recognizing Sears' standing was a finding of Sears' "vital and
immediate" interest in challenging section 904.92 However, the third
party interests involved were only "vital" to Sears as an integral part of
its defense. 93 A party's interest in defending against liability cannot be
considered a newly enunciated factor in determining whether to abandon
the general rule against third party standing. Thus, the question re-
mains whether only article III standards apply or whether some com-
bination of article III plus the Craig and Westinghouse rationales
constitute the test for the recognition of third party standing under the
Hetherton approach.9 4
If the Third Circuit's decision implies the abrogation of the
prudential rule against third party standing, standing will be more
readily granted to defendants seeking to use the shield of third party
rights. This possible impact must be tempered by questioning whether
the Third Circuit can in fact abrogate specific prudential limitations
delineated by the Supreme Court.9 5 Finally, the absence of clearly de-
90. See 652 F.2d at 1)54 n.2. Craig is also distinguishable from Hetherton
on a procedural basis. In Craig, the plaintiff, who raised the interests of third
parties argued that in order to comply with the challenged statute, she would
have to participate in unconstitutional discrimination, while in Hetherton the
defendant sought to raise third party interests as a shield to liability. For a
discussion of Craig, see notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra. The Court
has allowed the assertion of third party rights from a defensive posture when
the nature of the right sought to be asserted is a fundamental one. See Barrows
v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953). The right asserted in Hetherton, to participate
in the enforcement of § 904, cannot be characterized as a fundamental right.
See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
91. The court conceded that the equal protection issue was moot to the ex-
tent that resolution of the case would not benefit any Delaware citizens in the
future. 652 F.2d at 1156. For a discussion of mootness, see note 14 supra.
92. 652 F.2d at 1156. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
93. See 652 F.2d at 1156.
94. See id. at 1156-57.
95. In general, the Supreme Court has reversed lower federal courts for
failure to apply prudential limitations on standing. See Benzanson, supra, note
23. A useful analogy can be drawn to the abstention doctrine. See Railroad
Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In Pullman, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas had jurisdiction to hear
the plaintiffs' claim which involved two theories: 1) that the act complained of
was unauthorized under state law; and 2) that the act complained of violated
the equal protection clause. Id. at 498. The district court exercised juris-
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fined standards in Hetherton leaves future litigants unable to evaluate
what third party interests may be raised.90
Valerie Youmans Vilbert
diction and granted the plaintiffs' request for an injunction. Id. The United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the district court
should have abstained from deciding the case because the first issue involved
an unsettled issue of state law and a determination of that issue by the state
courts would have enabled the district court to avoid a decision on the constitu-
tional question. Id. at 501-02. Thus, even when article III jurisdiction require-
ments are met, prudential concerns may mandate dismissal of an action. See id.
Although the decision to abstain or not to abstain is regarded as "discretionary,"
it is reversible error to ignore prudential limitations. See Field, supra note 23.
96. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
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